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The  SARS-CoV-2 pandemic  has disturbed the order of the world-system. While central countries—through their 
pharmaceutical multinationals—focused on the development of  vaccines, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries 
fulfill another role, either by offering an environment for trials, or by inserting themselves in the hierarchical global 
order as a hub for research, development, or production of the candidate vaccines. This paper focuses on the 
analysis of the geopolitics of the world-system regarding production and participation in the clinical trials of 
vaccines for SARS-CoV-2 of Oxford University-AstraZeneca, BioNTech-Pfizer, and Sinopharm in Argentina. This 
is a case analysis of the Argentine semi-peripheral context, the local and global pharmaceutical industry, and the 
geopolitical order. We conclude that Argentina, which has scientific and industrial capabilities to manufacture 
vaccines, has joined in global value chains on the dependence side, deepening the scientific and technological gap 
vis-à-vis the central countries. 
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Several diverse voices of the political spectrum in Argentina celebrated during 2020 that the 
country was the place of research and development for important vaccines from global centers. 
AstraZeneca, Pfizer, and Sinopharm chose the country to be part of their complex vaccine 
development process, and that seemed excellent news. The country would even have preferential 
access to an important amount of doses once they had been manufactured and approved for 
application. In Hecht's (2009) terms, it was a techno-political achievement. Despite industrial 
facilities and important domestic scientific maturity, this turned out to be an example of how 
corporations in the core countries rely on the capabilities of the semi-periphery as a platform for 
their global businesses, accentuating the typical dependence of a peripheral country. 
When the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the virus a pandemic, it advocated for 
a solution and vaccines for all countries, rich or poor. It was a performative effort: the world is 
such that some countries have access to the production and distribution of vaccines while others 
do not. In this global quagmire, core states financed research and development alongside large 
pharmaceutical companies (having the necessary logistics to carry out the production of vaccines, 
to conduct their research in different phases and in several populations distributed throughout the 
geography that would provide key information to determine that vaccines were safe and effective). 
What role did the different countries play in this global value generation chain? This article studies 
the role of Argentina within the development of these vaccines. 
The coronavirus pandemic has different geopolitical dimensions in its global structure: 
centers, semi-peripheries, and peripheries. The global narrative during the pandemic has generally 
explained that in the world-system, the public and private sectors of the core countries invest 
millions in science, have global political initiative, forge and govern institutions of international 
cooperation, and monopolize most of the resources. The peripheral countries, by contrast, suffer 
from scarcity, poverty, and dependence on developed global players. 
Vaccine production and clinical trials around the world require vast sums of money, local 
political connections, national and international legal management capacity in industrial and health 
systems. On the contrary, poor countries, small companies, and scientific institutes or universities 
will find themselves under constraints. Rich countries and powerful players of global value chains 
have all the advantages. The countries of the global periphery will accentuate their dependence. 
But what about the countries of the semi-periphery? They have infrastructure for development, 
and therefore capabilities to produce vaccines as well as tools to obtain advantages in the 
negotiation for some of those immunizing drugs. However, the peripheralization will deepen, and 
the dependency on the core countries will tighten. Big Pharma and the interests of rich countries 
that have a global rather than a national approach to vaccine development will orientate research 
and development, technology design, and business. 
This paper seeks to analyze the geopolitics of the world-system in the production of Covid-
19 vaccines, and the participation in the clinical trials of AstraZeneca, Pfizer, and Sinopharm in 
the Argentine Republic through understanding their global value chains. In this sense, we propose 
to study (a) how and why Argentina was chosen as a participant in the vaccine production chain; 
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(b) the role of the state through its different ministries in the management of relations with both 
multilateral organizations, as well as countries, universities, and biotech corporations that transfer 
technology; additionally, (c) we propose to analyze the geographical configuration of production 
to describe what the production and marketing process will be like. Finally, we conclude by 
proposing an explanation of the geopolitical logic behind the international division of labor in the 
world system, the control of technology transfer knowledge, and the role of a semi-peripheral 
country like Argentina to take a qualitative leap in terms of local production sovereignty. 
 
World-Economy and Semi-Periphery 
Argentina has a long history of well-developed human resources for vaccine development and 
local production (Corvalán 2017; Roggero 2006). The focus on the semi-periphery dwells on the 
systemic role of Argentina and the global division of labor in which vaccine research, 
development, and/or production for SARS-CoV-2 of AstraZeneca, Pfizer, and Sinopharm take 
place. Through a review of recent scientific publications, the press, laws, and regulations we 
analyze how Argentina, having scientific and productive capabilities to manufacture vaccines, has 
joined in global value chains, deepening the scientific and technological gap vis-à-vis the central 
countries.  
Core economies are characterized by being areas in which diversified production of high 
profitability, advanced technology, and high wages is concentrated, while peripheral countries’ 
production is less diversified and profitable; wages and technology use is lower (Wallerstein 1976: 
462). While central countries have greater political and economic power—crystallized in higher 
levels of efficiency in the production of high-tech goods and higher prices in international 
markets—the periphery has a less sophisticated production system. Peripheral production is 
mainly export of raw materials and agricultural products, which present poorer international 
market’s prices. 
Argentina belongs to the semi-periphery—peripheral countries with certain industrial and 
scientific-technological capabilities that seek to compete in some segments of the world market 
defined by commercial applications based on technology—according to Wallerstein's 
classification of the world-system. In his words: “It is the normal condition of the global system 
having a three-layer structure,” otherwise the system disintegrates, since it would be “much less 
stable politically, because this would mean a polarized world system” (Wallerstein 1974a: 404). 
The main feature is the distance between rich and poor. The categories of center, periphery, and 
semi-periphery are based on the position of the countries in the international division of labor. The 
semi-peripheral countries share characteristics of both the center and the periphery, generating 
capital goods with lower intensity than the core states, or producing raw materials and agricultural 
products, with lower wages (Wallerstein 1974a). According to Wallerstein (1974b), the relevant 
issue is not the kind of production—industrial manufactures or raw materials—but the wages. In 
other words, a core country can produce raw materials and agricultural goods as long as there is 
capital-intensive technology combined with a well-paid and skilled labor force. Core activities are 
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characterized by a higher levels of profit associated with productivity and technology. On the other 
hand, non-core production obtains lower profits associated with lower levels of capital intensity.  
The countries of the center have superior levels of efficiency in the production of high-tech 
goods, and higher prices in international markets; while peripheral countries, having less 
sophisticated production systems, base their production mainly on low-technology goods. This 
way, “patterns of trade between countries constitute a relational structure in which some 
positions—the core positions—encourage relatively autonomous activity while others—the 
peripheral positions—encourage constrained or dependent activity” (Lloyd, Mahutga, and De 
Leeuw 2009: 52). Along the same lines, Evans (1979) associated the notion of semi-periphery with 
countries of the periphery with a certain industrial capacity driven by—integrated into—dependent 
development processes, characterized by the dominant presence of transnational capital in the most 
dynamic industrial sectors.  
Semi-peripheral countries hope to increase their productivity, to develop and export greater 
added value to other countries on the periphery; seeking to improve their influence and status 
within the regional subsystem. From the core-countries’ perspective, this aspiration of the semi-
peripheral countries is perceived as part of the path to development in economically strategic areas, 
which has a potentially destabilizing effect on the geopolitical and geoeconomic order (Hurtado 
and Souza 2018) assigned by the international division of labor (Hall and Chase-Dunn 2006). 
However, historical evidence shows that transitions from the semi-periphery to the center have 
been “very rare” (Chase-Dunn 1998: 121), which can be explained in part by the high access 
barriers, both formal and informal, to leading industrial technologies. Thus, most of the time the 
semi-periphery is not a transitional category but a permanent place within the world capitalist 
system (Babones 2005). According to some authors “semi-periphery” is not a descriptive category, 
but an analytical instrument to study change within the modern world-system, improving the 
analysis of global inequalities; focusing on spatial inequalities than the simple view of core-
periphery (Terlouw 2003).  
The countries of the semi-periphery are affected when it comes to crafting technology policy 
locally and escalating in the industrialization process, to escape dependence on commodities. The 
structure of the world-system constrains those countries that seek to complete their 
industrialization process, since there are formal and informal barriers to accomplishing the 
development process, designing, and producing technologies for cutting-edge industries. This 
implies:  
 
Institutional instability that hinders the efficacy of public policies; scant private 
investment in R&D; dynamic industrial sectors dominated by transnational firms 
whose maximizing strategies are largely unconnected from local economic 
ecosystems; the growing and harmful influence of speculative finance since the late 
1970s; and geopolitical disadvantage in negotiations on the “rules of the game” for 
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The debates about strategic technologies, such as nuclear, renewable energy, biotechnology, 
or vaccines, conceal a policy of the central economies to promote their own business while 
cooperating with peripherals they transfer costs and control over them (Hurtado and Souza 2018; 
Delvenne, Vasen, and Vara 2013). This shows an international division of labor in which central 
economies exercise economic advantages and control of production, having the know-how, 
patents, and capital to do it. Core firms take advantage of cheaper resources in the semi-periphery 
such as skilled labor and industrial facilities, research laboratories, and universities while standing 
as the forefront of technology. 
Argentina developed a series of strategies, including the local development of vaccines, 
increasing the number of hospital beds, local production of testing kits, and so on, to combat the 
pandemic (Rabinovich and Geffner 2021). Juliana Casattaro's group from the Institute of 
Biotechnological Research of the Universidad Nacional de San Martín is a noteworthy example. 
Her serum works on a recombinant vaccine that is at the preclinical phase (UNSAM 2020). Also, 
Claudio Prieto’s group from the Biotechnological Center at the Universidad Nacional del Litoral 
that works on developing a vaccine based on Virus Like Particles (UNL 2020). These national 
Research and Development (R&D) processes are partially blocked by local and global value 
chains, which end up importing technology (vaccines), or governing business, research, and 
knowledge; holding global patents and making it difficult to finance local researchers due to lack 
of resources that instead focus on the businesses of multinational pharmaceutical companies or 
their local partners, who see greater economic returns in tech transfer than in local development. 
From the 2008 world economic crisis, global governance has been difficult as levels of 
multilateralism are diminishing. Structural change is in the process of a new industrial revolution 
accompanied by the exhaustion of globalization as an economic cycle. In a context of economic 
financialization marked by volatility, the problem of real production is further exacerbated by 
dependence on financial speculation. The closure of the post-Fordism production cycle due to 
technological changes promotes dynamics of productive relocation, automation, and the 
integration of global value chains through digital platforms (Sanahuja 2017). 
In the twenty-first century, scientific and technological knowledge is a geopolitical factor and 
has become a commodity. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, “the business world began 
to recognize the importance of technological knowledge as a strategic asset” (Coriat and Weinstein 
2011: 273). The key aspect is knowledge and its ownership. Along with the property regime, the 
legislation that regulated the appropriation of company proprietorship was modified. The 
neoliberal model led to regulations such as the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States, which allowed 
patenting with funds contributed by the federal government, making it mandatory that all 
development financed by the state should be applied at the governmental level. This regulation 
allowed universities, laboratories, and firms to commercially develop technology financed by the 
state: “a spectacular boom of spin-offs” (Coriat and Weinstein 2011: 282). In fact, there is a strong 
concentration of power in the core countries regarding Big Pharma and its corporate behavior 
(Rikap 2019).    
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Biotechnology and Geopolitics 
The geopolitical dimension illuminates elements of international politics emphasized by the 2020 
pandemic; the fissures have increased, leading to nationalism and militarism (Díaz and Mountz 
2020), a vaccine nationalism (Santos Rutschman 2020), and a global reset and systemic rivalry 
(Dunford and Qi 2020). The question of the geopolitical order refers to the geographical and 
hierarchical elements that condition economic and political relations. “A mixture of cohesion and 
conflict between actors, an organized governance system that defines the actors, the rules, the 
principles of interaction, and shared conceptions among the actors about trade, force and 
diplomacy (Agnew and Cordbridge 1995: 15-16). This hierarchy has the structure of the three 
strata, in which a semi-peripheral Argentina is subsumed de facto to the policies of the powers and 
advanced economies of the core (Flint and Taylor 2018). The world-economy is a dynamic system 
based on flows of value from the bottom to the top (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1990; Clelland 
2014), being a question of power and extraction of value (Dallas, Ponte, and Sturgeon 2019). 
Argentina is a semi-peripheral country that has scientific and productive capacities to produce 
vaccines. However it has a subordinated role in global value chains and has been inserted in the 
global hierarchical order as a research, development, or producer hub for AstraZeneca, Pfizer, and 
Sinopharm against Covid-19. The hierarchical element of the geopolitical order, which unfolds 
within a framework of written and unwritten rules, is defined by the global distribution of capital-
labor relations, or international division of labor; that means, who produces what things (and under 
what conditions), who benefits (and with what margins), and how the terms of trade and value 
flows are decided. 
Central countries tend to see semi-peripheral countries’ aspiration to improve their 
technological capabilities as a crucial part of their path towards expanding strategic areas for 
endogenous development while having a potentially destabilizing effect on the geo-economy. At 
the same time, however, the industrialization and modernization of public infrastructure in central 
countries are coveted by peripheral countries as a means of gaining scale and reach in global 
technology markets.  
Value chains sometimes cross the borders of states, so they are subject to national authorities 
and regulations. A state can impose tariffs, decide what goods do enter; but also, in Wallerstein’s 
words “may pressure other governments to make conditions that are in the interests of the state 
placing the pressure, or in the interests of particular producers in the country of the state placing 
the pressure” (Wallerstein 2009: 83). This implies that each state actively takes part in its role in 
global value chains, contributing to reproduce the roles assigned to each society in the world-
system. 
In recent years, a process has taken place that led to the commodification of patents becoming 
an input for the financial economy and an instrument of speculation. The new commodities were 
regulated by legislation in the northern countries and then the southern countries were pushed to 
do the same, forcing them to pay rents for the use of goods with great added knowledge (Orsi and 
Coriat 2006; Merkina 2009; Danneels 2012; Landesmann 2015; Scazzieri, Baranzini, and Rotondi 
2015; Rikap 2019). In technologies such as chemistry or pharmaceuticals, “patents are used on a 
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relatively large scale as a direct source of income, as well as a means to block competing products. 
The possession of certain patented inventions has the ultimate purpose that a company benefits 
from its innovations” (Coriat, Orsi, and Weinstein 2003: 235). In several biotech industries, by 
placing R&D sites in certain locations other than their headquarters, companies can take advantage 
of resource rents and location-based relational subnets. This enables companies to extract 
technological rents through intellectual property rights and has implications not only for the 
competitiveness of the industry, but also for the power relations between companies, the state, and 
communities (Ipsen 2016: 41). However, the technological transformation in developing countries 
requires active policies on the part of the state that, under free market and rules made for advanced 
countries, would not work (Chang, Chima, and Mises 2002). The globalization of technological 
production processes contributed to the fragmentation and relocation of production.  
Global Value Chains constitute the sequence of activities that firms and workers carry out 
from the design of a product to its final use; the result of which is the emergence of different 
patterns of geographic structuring and governance, in which the inputs of production and services 
are developed where the necessary resources and skills exist and are available at a competitive 
price and quality (Porta, Santarcangelo and Schteingart 2017). The productive matrix in 
biotechnology has a share in these Global Value Chains, with R&D and production from several 
companies in the sector (Gutman and Lavarello 2014; UBATEC and CAB 2016). Networks of 
global cities participate in this global chain through the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry 
(Krätke 2013). 
The dominant paradigm in the pharmaceutical sector is the exploration of different types of 
chemical compounds and their subsequent organic synthesis. From the beginning, the industry was 
shaped by a handful of German and Swiss multinational corporations; the United States and the 
British joined them after the Second World War (Malerba and Orsenigo 2000; 2002). During and 
after the war this bloc of corporations benefited greatly from investment in biomedicine and in 
extensive health plans on the part of the Western powers. Until the mid-1970s, the global scenario 
of the pharmaceutical industry remained relatively stable, with few new members in the small 
group of multinationals that operated in the sector (Mazzucato and Dosi 2006). 
From then on, the industry suffered a series of setbacks that modified its structure, drastically 
changed the way they generated knowledge, and conditioned its operation to this day. Since the 
mid-1970s, advances in physiology, biochemistry and, above all, molecular biology, had fully 
struck the pharmaceutical industry. The birth of modern biotechnology came after (Gutman and 
Lavarello 2014). Before 1980, large multinationals of the main core of the industry searched for 
active ingredients to treat a pathology through a random trial-and-error process. New discoveries 
led to the understanding of biological genomic mechanisms of each particular pathology, and 
offered drugs or vaccines to solve it and satisfied those market niches (Gambardella 1995). 
The new actors are the small biotechnology companies that emerged around American 
universities after the sanction of the Bayh-Dole Act. (Angell 2004; Corvalán 2017). At the 
beginning of this process it was believed that, at a global level, large pharmaceutical companies 
would be replaced by small biotechnological spin offs; these smaller laboratories boosted their 
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growth in the use of molecular biology, genetic engineering, and bioinformatics strategies 
(Gutman and Lavarello 2014). What actually happened was a division of labor within the 
pharmaceutical business;. Biotechnology companies and public laboratories deal with the 
upstream part: research, knowledge generation, and development; and large pharmaceutical 
companies deal with the burdensome clinical tests of the products and the aggressive 
commercialization required to place them on the market. These multinationals acquire the 
intellectual property of the molecules developed or directly absorb them from small biotechnology 
companies, buying them out (Mazzucato and Dosi 2006). 
Following Angell (2004), R&D in biotechnology firms is quite similar to those carried out by 
large pharmaceutical companies. It differs in that instead of producing small molecules through 
chemical means, biotech labs are mainly dedicated to creating or modifying very large molecules, 
such as proteins or hormones, using biologically living systems—often with DNA recombination 
technology, which refers to techniques based on molecular biology and applied genomics that 
make it possible to cut and paste fragments of genetic information with the aim of modifying 
genomes of living organisms to carry out some useful work for pharmaceutical and economic 
purposes. 
The contemporary, modern vaccine industry is considered one of the most important branches 
of biotechnology, in an institutional framework made up of public laboratories, universities, 
different profiles of biotechnology companies (Malerba and Orsenigo 2002; Pisano 2006), and a 
smaller number of large companies (Gutman and Lavarello 2014). The emergence of modern 
biotechnology had a decisive impact on the production and market of vaccines. Molecular biology 
and genetic engineering techniques that opened a field of action on the modification of the genome 
have eliminated most of the technical barriers that previously limited its development. Much of 
the rapid growth in the development of new vaccines is due to the implementation of advances in 
biotechnology that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. This set of technological tools presented 
new opportunities to treat infectious diseases, as well as cancer, allergies, and chronic diseases 
(Levine 2004). 
The notorious concentration in the number of suppliers of these inputs in industrialized 
countries—the result of technological change and its monopoly ownership with the new regime of 
intellectual property—obdurated processes of industrialization and increased the technological 
center-periphery gap (Hurtado and Zubeldía 2017) which undermined production capacity, making 
the supply of vaccines unequal (Angell 2004). The resulting international market for vaccines has 
been structured into two segments: traditional vaccines, low cost and technological aggregate, used 
and produced predominantly by countries of the periphery or semi-periphery; and modern 
vaccines, high cost and technological aggregate, used and manufactured for the most part by 
central countries (Corvalán 2010; Gadelha et al. 2020; WHO, UNICEF and World Bank 2010). 
In the central countries, the traditional vaccines—attenuated or inactivated pathogens—were 
gradually replaced by more sophisticated modern vaccines: second generation—subunit, 
recombinant, conjugated vaccines—and even third generation—virus like particles, RNA or DNA 
vaccines, vector vaccines (Corvalán 2010; Fernández et al. 2020). As a corollary, the number of 
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producers and suppliers of traditional vaccines in developing countries had an exponential 
increase, representing 86 percent of suppliers worldwide. Low-cost and mainly traditional vaccines 
with low technological complexity are produced by these suppliers in developing countries for 
local or in other low- and middle- income countries use, a market that constitutes 84 percent of the 
world's population (WHO et al. 2010). The other side concentrates strongly a few economic 
players, vaccine producers in developed countries; in which a handful of large pharmaceutical 
companies, with great access to financing and oligopolistic positions, dominate the market. In 
2017, only four large multinationals—GSK (24 percent), Merck (23 percent), Pfizer (22 percent), 
and Sanofi (21 percent)—were responsible for approximately 90 percent of the total amount earned 
from vaccine sales in the world (Gadelha et al. 2020). In 2018, the pharmaceutical market was 
$864 billion in size. Within it, vaccine sales accounted for $30,500 million, 3.5 percent of the 
sector's revenue (Gadelha et al. 2020). 
 
Table 1: Traditional and Modern Vaccines: Examples and Technical Characteristics 
Table 1: Elaborated by the authors based on Folegatti et al. 2020 and Mulligan et al. 2020 
 
Semi-peripheral countries face a global context with two macroeconomic variables. The first 
one, an oligopolistic structure of suppliers from developed countries—fewer than ten players 
worldwide—with strong intellectual protection systems and royalties that set significant barriers 
to cutting-edge development and processes to shorten the technological gap (Corvalán 2017). The 
second one is a growing financialization of the economic agents of the drug market and a 
preponderance of the generation of value through financial assets instead of production and 
systematic investment in R&D (Chena, Buccela, and Bosnic 2018). 
 
Global Governance Bodies  
From the point of view of the global scale of world-system, some scholars point out that there is a 
global governance of the value chains of a public and private nature, controlled by several parties, 
involving “control over logistics, the division of labor in the chain, technology and innovation, 
property rights, branding and other determinants of competitive positioning in final markets and 
the distribution of returns” (Davis, Kaplinsky, and Morris 2018: 44). Despite the multilateral 
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nature of international trade regimes and legislation, advanced economies have an advantage in 
setting the rules of the game, owed to their privileged position as core over the periphery mentioned 
above. Many international financial institutions such as “the World Bank [have] viewed 
conditionality as a blueprint package of policy conditions attached to tranche release of single 
loans” (Branson and Hanna 2000: 1). 
Since the 1990s, through policies framed by the Washington Consensus and a neoliberal 
agenda, the National Health System of Argentina transferred several competencies towards sub-
national governments. Simultaneously, global technocratic organisms acquired competencies and 
power, constituting themselves as agents for the governance of liberalization (Khor 2008). A case 
in point is the 1994 Agreement on Trade in Pharmaceutical Products (concluded during the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations): it “eliminates tariffs and other duties and charges on a large 
number of pharmaceutical products and the substances used to produce them” (WTO Web). “The 
World Bank…has become a policy advisor and international financier of drugs [and] vaccines… 
in low and middle-income countries” (Govindaraj, Reich, and Cohen 2000: 1). This involvement 
in pharmaceuticals is embedded in the partnership on pharmaceutical policy and provision with 
WHO and other multilateral institutions. 
Global health governance bodies, foundations, and alliances that operate in the vaccine 
market had a considerable impact on the productive capacities of Argentina. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), parallel with the 
technological change described above, began to outline a series of recommendations and initiatives 
for member countries in the mid-1970s. We highlight the EPI (Expanded Program on 
Immunization) of 1974 (Levine 2004), the creation of the PAHO Revolving Fund for the 
acquisition of vaccines—from which Argentina currently obtains more than 85 percent of these 
inputs (Zubeldía 2020 )—to ensure the supply of vaccines to poor countries in Latin America. 
UNICEF joined this group of institutions in the 1980s, making massive purchases of vaccines 
from suppliers in developed countries to channel them to poorer countries together with PAHO, in 
joint purchase funds; generating economies of scale for transnational companies in the sector. 
(Corvalán 2017). In the 1980s these were traditional childhood vaccines, the core group of six 
diseases: diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio, measles, and tuberculosis (WHO et al. 2010). 
The global market for vaccines did not represent a major source of profit for the large 
pharmaceutical transnationals until the 1980s, when the advances of modern biotechnology began 
to be applied (Levine 2004). Simultaneously, there was progress in the health policies of the semi-
peripheral states of the suggestions and initiatives of the WHO; obtaining vaccines through the 
PAHO Revolving Fund—and in countries on the periphery, massive donations from UNICEF—
and EPI. The generation capacity of modern vaccines increased significantly in suppliers of central 
economies: transnational companies that saw peripheral economies as a way to gain markets and 
scale. The global governance bodies linked to health began to channel the placement of these 
supplies in markets of the periphery or semi-periphery. 
During the 1990s, the enactment of GATT/TRIPS increased the oligopolistic conditions of 
the sector, strengthening the penetration capacity of five or six multinationals in global markets 
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with the ability to overcome entry barriers by implementing specific technical regulations in its 
formulation, capacity to generate economies of scale, pay for multi-center clinical trials in 
manifold countries, logistical power to carry out registries, and approvals in several regulatory 
agencies simultaneously—first and foremost in Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and European 
Medicines Agency (EMA)—enabled more iron-clad strategies of intellectual protection through 
patents (Martínez, Piva, and Tripo 2019). 
Corvalán (2017) describes the loss of vaccine production capacities in Argentina as the WHO 
and PAHO health policies penetrate the country. Since the mid-1970s, when these two 
organizations began to recommend policies for the application of vaccines to their member 
countries, these supplies began to be imported. Until the end of the twentieth century, Argentina 
retained part of its local production capacity; but the arrival of multinational pharmaceutical 
companies was reflected in the addition of vaccines to the national vaccination calendar (NVC). 
As of 2002, another phase began, in which transnational firms in the NVC pushed for the 
dismantling of organizational and local production capacities and a copious entry of newer 
vaccines.  Between 2003 and 2012, eight modern vaccines were added to the NVC, besides the 
eight that previously existed. The participation of multinationals increased from 64 percent to 79 
percent in the same stage (Corvalán 2017 ). Currently, four of the 18 in the CNV are from local 
production (Zubeldía 2020). 
Meanwhile, in 2000, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) was created 
in an initiative that brings together the WHO, UNICEF, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
and the private monopoly industry—Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Merck, 
Novartis, Sanofi-Pasteur, Janssen, Sanofi-Aventis, and Pfizer (Greco 2004). This alliance is one 
more arm of the WHO to sign sales agreements with different states, and each transnational 
laboratory has its own specialty: for example, Merck markets rotavirus vaccines like Rotateq and 
the HPV vaccine Gardasil; Sanofi markets the yellow fever and polio vaccines; Pfizer the 
pneumococcal vaccine; Janssen the Quinvaxem pentavalent vaccine DTP-HepB-Hib (GAVI 
2020). 
GAVI also works with donors, including central country governments and private sector 
foundations. NGOs, advocacy groups, professional and community associations, religious 
organizations, and the academic world are central to the validation role that large laboratories need 
to penetrate a state’s health policy design (GAVI 2020). The discursive scaffold of alliances like 
EPI or the PAHO Revolving Fund are similar: equity in vaccines access to poor countries vis-à-
vis industrialized countries; population growth and dangers of transmission of infectious diseases 
as a consequence of travel and migration; and the damage supposedly generated by sovereign 
policies or initiatives in health matters, isolated from global institutions’ advice (Greco 2004). 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and Covid-19 Vaccine Global 
Access (COVAX) complete the scenario. CEPI is an association of public, private, philanthropic, 
and civil organizations, funded through its own donations. It was launched in 2017, with the aim 
of developing vaccines against emerging infectious diseases. It focuses on WHO’s “blueprint 
priority diseases,” including: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-
 
Journal of World-Systems Research   |   Vol. 27   Issue 2   |   Blinder et al.  505 
 
jwsr.pitt.edu   |   DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2021.1049 
CoV), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), Nipah virus, Lassa 
fever virus, and Rift Valley fever virus; as well as Chikungunya virus, and what they called a 
hypothetical and unknown pathogen “Disease X.” It was co-founded and co-funded with $460 
million from the Gates Foundation, The Wellcome Trust—a London based charity for biomedical 
research—and a consortium of nations, including Norway, Japan, and Germany, later joined by 
the European Union (2019) and Great Britain (2020). In 2020, CEPI was identified as a “key player 
in the race to develop a vaccine” for Covid-19 disease (Gouglas et al. 2019; Coy 2020). 
In partnership with the WHO and GAVI as well, CEPI launched COVAX to ensure equitable 
access to Covid-19 vaccines for all countries. In addition to WHO, GAVI and CEPI, and COVAX, 
access facilitation to vaccines against Covid-19, in collaboration with vaccine manufacturers from 
central and peripheral countries, is the only global initiative that works with governments and 
manufacturers to ensure that Covid-19 vaccines are available worldwide for both core and 
peripheral countries (GAVI 2021). 
 
Argentina: Covid-19 Vaccines 
The agreements of the Argentine State that we will analyze are: AstraZeneca an Anglo-Swedish 
firm with mAbxience, producer of bio-similars, to manufacture the active ingredient of the vaccine 
developed by the University of Oxford. Pfizer and BioNTech, an alliance of an American and a 
German firm with the Infant Foundation, carried out phase III trials of their vaccine at the Central 
Military Hospital “Cirujano Mayor Dr. Cosme Argerich”. Lastly, Chinese Sinopharm with the 
Huésped Foundation to carry out Phase III at “Vacunar” center, sponsored by ELEA laboratories. 
Whether producing commodities or advanced manufactures, if the full knowledge of the process 
of production is located overseas and is property of foreign firms, and the local or international 
legislation constrains how or what to produce, the country is in a subordinate position in the world-
system. The three Phase III cases analyzed are vaccine developments whose knowledge has been 
produced overseas, and these corporations from the United States, Europe, and China use local 
resources and facilities to solve the global problem of the pandemic. 
 
 AstraZeneca and mAbxience. In order to produce the vaccine against Covid-19 in Latin 
America, AstraZeneca signed an agreement with mAbxience in August 2020. mAbxience is a 
biotechnology company specialized in research, development, and manufacture of biosimilar 
antibodies—monoclonal antibodies—to treat oncological and autoimmune diseases; it is a part of 
the pharmaceutical group Insud Pharma. The mentioned agreement took place between private 
parties; the Anglo-Swedish laboratory selected mAbxience as one of the few companies in Latin 
America that could manufacture the active ingredient of the viral vector vaccine (Folegatti et al. 
2020). In the words of Hugo Sigman, founder of Grupo Insud, “this was a negotiation between 
private parties, no government played any role. AstraZeneca approached us and understood that 
ours was the best factory. They did all the inquiries and verified the technological requirements 
and the adequacy of the facilities” (Perfil 2020). It is remarkable to note the absence of government 
involvement to intercede and/or specify strategic state objectives linked to health solutions for the 
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pandemic when the agreement was signed. The Slim Foundation, also part of the agreement, 
finances the vaccine, which is produced at risk. Phase III was underway in Brazil, the United 
Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States (AstraZeneca 2020; Página 12 2020a; Página 12 
2020b). The vaccine is expected to cost $3 to $4 per dose, allowing drug companies to cover their 
expenses but not generate a profit (Smink 2020). 
The link that locks the production chain is that while mAbxience will manufacture the active 
ingredient of the vaccine—the assembled viral particle—the Mexican laboratory Liomont will 
package it; “a practical decision due to the number of doses to be filled,” according to the Chief 
Scientific Officer of mAbxience Argentina, Esteban Corley. Specifically, the process of packaging 
and finishing the injectable will be carried out in Mexico. Before the pandemic, the Liomont 
Company produced health supplies and drugs for the Mexican and U.S. markets. There is a sort of 
international division of labor in pharmaceutical code. Now, based on these facts, some questions 
may be formulated: Why did the Argentine state not intervene in the negotiations between the 
Argentine company and the multinational? Could it have been negotiated that part of the active 
principle remained and be packaged locally in one of the smaller volume plants that exist in our 
country? It is a strategic asset in the midst of a pandemic of unknown proportions, and it does not 
seem very pragmatic that the technology transfer for the production of the modified adenovirus 
should be made, finished packaging 8,000 kilometers away, and then bought and brought back. 
The idea of the pharmaceutical company is “to produce the vaccine in each region, but with local 
producers” (Esteban 2020a). Is the insertion in the global chain of value of the vaccine in a 
dependent key, satisfying the logistics needs of the multinational to place its production in one of 
the largest markets in the world? 
 
Pfizer and BioNTech: An mRNA Vaccine. The vaccine designed by the American 
multinational Pfizer and the German biotechnology company BioNTech is based on the 
technology of mRNA—messenger ribonucleic acid. These are third-generation vaccines, which 
had never been tested in humans until the pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-2 (Fernández et al. 
2020; Navas 2020a). The mRNA vaccines promise a new era in vaccinology and this is due, among 
other causes, to productive reasons: they are easier to manufacture and scale industrially than any 
other type of vaccine (Servick 2020). Phase III trials for this vaccine in Argentina began in August 
and ended in late November 2020, at the Central Military Hospital Cirujano Mayor Dr. Cosme 
Argerich (CABA). The trials were coordinated by the team of Dr. Fernando Polack, a pediatrician 
and infectious disease specialist who runs the Infant Foundation specialized in the study of diseases 
of the respiratory system (Disposal ANMAT 2020a). Study applicants received two doses, the first 
in August and the second three weeks later. If this vaccine version would obtain good results—as 
it did later—Argentina could have been in a place of preference at the time of contesting access to 
the necessary doses (Esteban 2020b). Argentina represented 13 percent of the global study in that 
phase (Lavieri 2020). 
In a first stage, the drug passed the safety and toxicity examination that began in Germany in 
late April and in the United States in early May, with which it received approval from the FDA to 
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advance towards the following phases. Phase III was carried out in Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, 
Turkey, Germany, and the United States (Lavieri 2020; Mulligan et al. 2020). Offering a platform 
and logistics to test vaccines for large transnational companies, meanwhile, seems to be the 
negotiation tool for poor, peripheral, or semi-peripheral countries, to access a preferential position 
on the waiting list for a vaccine or a partial transfer of technology from a multinational (Navas 
2020b). In Polack's words, “Traditionally, countries that have the privilege of participating in trials 
of this nature open the door to receiving priority vaccine shipments and that is what everyone 
participating in the trials wish” (Infobae 2020a), something that as of February 2020 did not 
materialize. Medical foundations, NGOs, and the media played the role of legitimizing clinical 
tests carried out at an unusual speed, without conducting extensive animal tests and avoiding long 
times to monitor side effects and/or adverse reactions, usually between two and five years. Among 
Infant’s main contributors are the Gates Foundation, the National Institute of Health of the United 
States (NIH) and the Molecular Research Council of England, the PATH Foundation, MITS 
Surveillance, Georgetown University and the Thrasher Research Fund—institutions with a global 
reach (Foundation Infant 2020). 
This platform was completed in Argentina, with the logistics capacity of the Central Military 
Hospital. In this sense, it is questionable and quite shocking that this capacity and organization—
strategic for the interests of the nation such as the Argentine Army—is put at the service of clinical 
trials in humans for Big Pharma. Finally, it is troublesome from a political and economic point of 
view that its storage requires a special refrigeration of minus 70 degrees celsius (O'Donnell 2020), 
a technology most of the non-central countries lack, and that requires electrical power and logistics 
that peripheral countries do not have; and if they acquire it, they would have to do it abroad. 
 
SinoPharm-ELEA Laboratory. The China National Biotech Group (CNBG), affiliated with 
the China National Pharmaceutical Group (Sinopharm)—a Chinese public pharmaceutical 
company—in collaboration with the Beijing Institute of Biological Products (BIBP) developed a 
vaccine based on the inactivated SARS-CoV-2 virus (Sicilia 2020), an older and simpler 
technology than the two previous cases. The BIBP is the main vaccine manufacturer in China, a 
prequalified institute by the WHO and the only one that has the regulatory approval of Biosafety 
Level 3 for the manufacture of vaccines based on virus culture (Reyes 2020; Romero 2020). 
During Phases I and II, this candidate vaccine was found to be safe and elicited an immune 
response. Three hundred and twenty volunteers—18 to 59 years old—received their doses and, 
according to the results, produced enough antibodies to neutralize the virus. The Journal of 
American Medical Association (Xia et al. 2020; Esteban 2020b) and The Lancet (Xia et al. 2021) 
published the study; they found the vaccine was “safe” and “capable of generating an immune 
response” (BAE Negocios 2020a). Phase III of the trials with 15,000 volunteers is underway in 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (Esteban 2020b), Peru, Morocco, Pakistan, Serbia, and Jordan 
(Cunzolo 2020). A two-dose scheme is used and more than 150,000 doses have already been 
applied in Chinese territory (BAE Negocios 2020b). Sinopharm's industrial plant in Beijing could 
produce 200 million doses per year (Esteban 2020b). 
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Through efforts carried out by the Ministry of Health (MinSal), at the end of August, 
Argentina reached an agreement allowing the Chinese state firm to carry out Phase III trials in 
Argentina (Esteban 2020b; Disposal ANMAT 2020b). The Huésped Foundation was the local 
organization chosen to manage Sinopharm’s study Elea-Phoenix laboratories sponsorship 
(Cunzolo 2020), a national capital company belonging to Insud Pharma, which also owns 
mAbxience. The trial was done at the “Vacunar” and “Proteger” centers. This was a 12-month 
study and included 3,000 volunteers, over 18 years of age, in good health. The objective was to 
complete the recruitment phase in two months, finish the study phase by the end of the year, and 
have the data analysis for the first quarter of 2021 (Romero 2020). Huésped Foundation has been 
supported by global institutions and multinational companies: WHO, PAHO, UNICEF, European 
Union, the World Bank, and the NIH. There is also support from large international laboratories, 
such as Pfizer, GSK, ViiV Healthcare (Foundation Huésped 2020). 
 
Table 2: Vaccine Agreements Concerted in Argentina 
 
Table 2: Elaborated by the authors based on Folegatti et al 2020; Mulligan et al. 2020, and Xia et al. 2020 
 
Conclusion 
Corporate interests of large pharmaceuticals and their local partners block semi-peripheral research 
and production. Big Pharma demands states compromise sovereign assets in negotiations, 
sometimes based on public health emergencies (Davies et al. 2021). Local medical corporations 
and laboratories find a strong niche for their know-how; partnering with global value chains, 
oriented local foundations, and institutions, they swap the chance to develop a national vaccine for 
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the privilege of providing logistics for tests, hospitals, patients, and knowledge. By the time 
vaccines finally became available, the main pharmaceutical companies of advanced economies 
have provided the doses to immunize the population, obtaining royalties from the treasuries of 
semi-peripheral countries that did not bet on their own national system of science, technology, and 
industry. The research, development, and production capacities of a semi-peripheral economy such 
as Argentina would be diminished by each batch of vaccines purchased from states or foreign 
companies, which would defund the National State and its public science and health system, with 
millions of dollars transferred abroad for vaccines.. Each dose of the few main vaccines to be 
available in the market will be $4 to $37 per unit (Hooker and Palumbo 2020). Even though the 
price per dose is established in secret negotiations between a state and the pharmaceutical 
companies a rough estimate can be made asserting $20 per dose as an average. Each two doses-
vaccinated citizen in Argentina will cost the treasury $40. If half the population were vaccinated, 
it would cost the state $800 million per year; which, by investing steadily in development, the 
approval by regulatory authorities, production, and placing on the market, the state could have had 
a vaccine manufactured locally. 
It is a fact that the international market for vaccines for Covid-19 is unfair. Rich economies 
have hoarded a large portion of vaccines in their stock, while the peripheral countries face a 
shortage, expressing the contradictions of the world-system. However, this gap is further 
accentuated when we observe that the production, design, and management of vaccines is 
concentrated in central countries. Likewise, a quarter of the world population will not receive 
vaccines until 2022 due to the central countries vaccines’ hoarding (Gutiérrez 2020). Moreover, 
pharmaceutical companies have requested modification of the legislation as a condition for the 
sale of vaccines, imposing conditions on countries such as Argentina (Ibáñez 2020), setting the 
rules of the game on semi-peripheral and peripheral countries that exclude possibilities for future 
innovation and development.  
In the last four decades, the biopharmaceutical sector underwent profound structural changes. 
It developed new heuristics and organizational capacities around modern biotechnology, molecular 
biology, and genetic engineering. The oligopolistic appropriation of these technologies was a 
consequence of the “R&D privatization” process that took place after the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) TRIPS, restricted peripheral or semi-peripheral countries access (Gadelha et 
al. 2020). Second and third generation vaccines, whose development involves the use of molecular 
biology, genomics, and genetic engineering tools, remained, through aggressive intellectual 
protection strategies, in the hands of few world players. Many poor countries found access to, but 
especially the production of vaccines linked to modern biotechnology difficult. 
Place assignment of countries in global value chains responds to certain geopolitics. The link 
in which a country locates itself within global value chains is a consequence of 
geopolitics. Pharmaceutical multinationals, large for-profit corporations and interests in R&D 
form an intricate link of lobbying and States relations, international organizations, and civil society 
organizations imprinting their interests in health and vaccination purposes. However, is the role 
given to the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery the same as those of the dynamic centers 
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of capitalism? Argentina, a country in the semi-periphery, is part of that geographic order assigned 
as a vaccine testing hub whose accumulated knowledge is raised in other geographic centers, and 
with whose population the final tests are carried out to stop the global pandemic. Discourses of 
scientific excellence and national productive capacities may have played a central role in the choice 
of the country for vaccine production by these corporations; and their potential benefits will be 
global in health and corporate in terms of knowledge, profits and profitability. Argentina does not 
have access to full local production—the complete value chain—capacity and with free 
manufacturing availability as it is conditioned by international laws and contracts. Argentina, 
finally  has got access to vaccines to mitigate the disease in the national territory1.  
However, only one part of the vaccine production is carried out locally. The vaccine 
developed by the University of Oxford, produced and marketed by AstraZeneca,  only produce the 
active ingredient—modified chimpanzee adenovirus—in Argentina but the final packaging and 
completion of the serum will take place in Mexico. The country must buy them at a price between 
$3 and $4 a dose. In the case of the Pfizer mRNA vaccine, the agreement does not provide for 
local manufacture. In the case of the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine, it is unknown if there is a 
technology transfer agreement for a local company to manufacture the inactivated virus and 
packaging of the vaccine.  
We need to ask ourselves about vaccine production dependency in the global value chain, 
questioning whether it satisfies the logistic needs of a multinational with the purpose of placing its 
production in one of the largest markets in the world. The strategic objectives of the Argentine 
state in health terms appear fuzzy in this agreement, since it did not intervene in the negotiation; 
not publicly at least. Moreover, in the context of vaccination against Covid-19, third generation 
vaccines are being produced but they had never been tested in humans before—in the case of 
Pfizer—and on top of the pandemic urgency it raises questions not only of a medical nature, but 
of a political one, because of the role of the populations used voluntarily for these tests. 
In an unequal geopolitical order, the periphery and semi-periphery are limited in their 
development capacities of local knowledge, trial matrix, and market access, deepening the 
scientific and technological gap with advanced countries. To achieve certain levels of 
technological autonomy and sovereignty, it is necessary to achieve local R&D levels, scaling, and 
distribution capabilities. The vaccine as public policy is developed and produced by domestic state 
and private laboratories. Scientific institutions and regulatory agencies prevent other states and 
pharmaceutical corporations from blocking access to the necessary technology that can be 
 
1 The first batches of vaccines that the country was able to obtain in the first months of 2021 were from Sputnik V of 
the Gamaleya Institute, Russia. Several weeks later it was announced that Argentina's Richmond laboratory would 
produce Sputnik domestically, strengthening Argentine-Russian bilateral relations, and Argentinian reliance (except 
for AstraZeneca) on non-Western vaccines. Richmond laboratory has the technology to package the doses produced 
in Russia, receiving a technology transfer similar to the contract with AstraZeneca, without participating in its 
development. On the other hand, the Pfizer vaccine had not reached Argentina because the contract was not signed 
due to legal differences between the Argentine State and the American multinational. Subsequently, the president of 
Argentina signed a decree in July 2021 to receive doses from laboratories in the United States. Days later, Moderna 
vaccines arrived in the form of donations (Centenera 2021).  
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profitable for the national economy and, eventually, be exported in order to position domestic 
actors with the capacity to generate income and substitute technological imports. 
Since the 1970s, simultaneously with this concentration process, a network of global 
institutions and multilateral organizations specialized in health has been set up. These networks do 
not legislate in international matters, but “advise” on certain health policies. The universal 
vaccination initiatives, promoted by the WHO, played a decisive role in consolidating the most 
concentrated players in the industry; later, new organizations such as PAHO, UNICEF—placing 
supplies in Latin America and peripheral countries—GAVI, CEPI, and the most recent, COVAX, 
completed the scenario. The decline in the productivity of new drugs observed in the 2000s 
contributed to increased industry interest in investing in vaccines (Gadelha et al. 2020). On the 
other hand, the WTO has sanctioned countries for not complying with TRIPS. For example, for 
producing any type of medicine outside the rigid intellectual protection system—which limits the 
shortening of the biotechnological gap based on imitative paths of industrialization—with which 
the large transnational companies protect their developments (Correa 1997). 
Thus, a set of pliers is formed between the WHO and the WTO in which deindustrialized 
countries or those with a medium industrial level in the pharmaceutical sector, such as Argentina, 
are trapped. One pushes for health policy functional to the large pharmaceutical conglomerate—
the WHO—and another ensures that the blocking capacity is not violated—the WTO. As the 
globalization process has progressed, the capabilities of R&D, development, production, and 
scaling around the production of vaccines has been dismantled in Argentina. Argentine 
pharmaceutical production capacities were decimated proportionally to the speed with which 
vaccines were added to the National Vaccination Plan (Corvalán 2017). A clear example of the 
loss of technological and health sovereignty vis-à-vis multilateral health organizations and 
multinational pharmaceutical companies is the sanction by Congress of the “Law on Vaccines 
Intended to Generate Acquired Immunity Against COVID-19” in October 20202; it offers an 
“extension of jurisdiction in favor of arbitral and judicial tribunals based abroad” and financial 
indemnity regarding compensation and other claims (Lombardi 2020). Later, the Ministry of 
Health reported that Pfizer demanded a new law and that the contract should not be signed by the 
minister of the area, but by the president himself—a request considered “unacceptable” (Infobae 
2020a). The safety of vaccines approved in record time is not assured, and the large corporation 
has demanded guarantees from states that there will be no economic consequences if there are 
serious adverse reactions to the vaccine or problems with the conservation regarding to logistics 
and delivery. 
Likewise, the domestic pharmaceutical sector consolidated in the last three decades makes 
low or null investments in R&D (ENDEI II 2020); it aims to maintain its profit margins based on 
price increases, guaranteed purchase of vaccines by the state, and technology transfers from global 
value chains while remaining totally disconnected from the local biomedical knowledge-
generation ecosystem. The situation is completed with Big Pharma and global governance bodies, 
 
2 Law No. 27573 was promulgated on November 6, 2020 by the Presidency. 
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medical foundations, and NGOs funding—Infant and Huésped—ensuring the moral and 
“scientific” scaffolding that legitimize the actions of the big players. The medical corporations 
play a prominent role in enforcing these policies. 
Argentina signed three agreements with AstraZeneca and mAbxience, among others, to 
produce the active component of the vaccine developed by the University of Oxford; the one that 
Pfizer and BioNTech have with the Infant Foundation to carry out Phase III trials of their vaccine; 
and the one agreed by Sinopharm with the Huésped Foundation to carry out Phase III, sponsored 
by ELEA Phoenix. The three vaccines have different technical characteristics: a recombinant 
chimpanzee adenovirus vaccine, an mRNA vaccine, and another attenuated virus vaccine. The 
Ministry of Health sought to ensure—directly or indirectly—the provision of numerous different 
vaccines, eclectic from a technological point of view, with the stated aim of ensuring a sufficient 
supply and of having technical alternatives in the event that one (or several) fails. AstraZeneca’s 
and Pfizer’s vaccines are modern, third-generation vaccines with high technological value, while 
the Chinese vaccine is traditional. However, the new technology had never been used in humans 
before. An mRNA vaccine had never been approved to treat any infectious contagious disease, 
and there is no history of clinical trials carried out outside of a pandemic. Applying this technology 
in a health crisis is not the most advisable from biosecurity viewpoint, because the pressure 
prevents a clear assessment of the possible side effects and unwanted adverse reactions that may 
be harmful to health and that may appear in the medium or long term. However, an mRNA vaccine 
is easy to scale industrially and it’s a flexible platform, which means it’s easy—cheap and fast—
to redirect towards new strains of SARS-CoV-2 (Schlake et al. 2012). 
On the other hand, the AstraZeneca vaccine is based on an adenovirus that causes colds in 
chimpanzees. The presumption is that, given this characteristic, it could not cause any pathology 
in humans; a viral particle is being introduced to the body that has never received it before. From 
an immunological point of view it carries a risk because there are no guarantees that it cannot cause 
another pathology. For this reason, there was a controversy, regarding the Russian vaccine against 
Covid-19, Sputnik V, designed by the Gamaleya Center; which uses two doses of a modified 
human adenovirus vaccine (Sputnik V 2020; Infobae 2020b). For this type of platform, there were 
already three globally approved vaccines, with more than 60,000 people injected against Ebola 
fever in Africa, China, and Russia. It is a technology of proven efficacy and safety, even used 
against cancer (Sputnik V 2020). 
It is expected that, in the near future, zoonotic events—infectious contagious diseases 
travelling from animals to humans—will grow as a result of ecological degradation and the 
consequent elimination of natural barriers—jungles, forests, large masses of ice—between 
humanity and different types of non-human animals and microorganisms (Wallace 2016). Having 
local platforms for the production of vaccines with a diversified range of technologies will be 
essential to prevent the large pharmaceutical industry and central countries from unloading the 
global costs of each health crisis, in human, social, and economic terms, on peripheral and semi-
peripheral nations. This will require regional planning, because the blocking capacity of 
transnationals and multilateral organizations cannot be dealt with solely from Argentina. 
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